A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL CORRUPTION CONTROL

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To enable a better understanding of the similarities, distinctions, frictions, and complementarities among corruption control types and to lay the groundwork for future study of their effectiveness in combination, I set forth a theoretical basis for considering a corruption control type in the context of other corruption control types. I draw from both the organizational control literature and the corruption control literature to conceptually derive an interrelated set of corruption control types, based on their important underlying dimensions and functions.

Organizational corruption, which I define here as the pursuit of individual interests by one or more organizational actors through the intentional misdirection of organizational resources or perversion of organizational routines, is commonly understood to be highly undesirable for any parties holding a stake in the organization’s performance. Even when the actors ostensibly direct the corrupt behavior on behalf of rather than against the organization, the behavior may ultimately impede the organization’s ability to accomplish its legitimate purpose and may threaten its very survival. Organizational leaders, therefore, attempt to limit corruption using the range of control means at their disposal. In this paper I put forward a way of organizing the array of corruption control types and of understanding their conceptual similarities and differences. In so doing, I provide a theoretical foundation for scholarly exploration and practical consideration of corruption control types in the context of other corruption control types, including how types may conflict with or complement each other.

As an illustration of some of the many corruption controls found in organizations, consider the experience of a prototypical employee. Upon arriving at work, he uses his password to log onto his computer and notes supervisory approval for a business trip. He proceeds to ask the travel coordinator to book the trip. Soon after, he learns that his work team has called a mandatory meeting to reach a consensus both on new rules for reporting billable project hours and on procedures for disciplining members who violate those rules. Later in the workday, he hears that the firm has fired a coworker for passing proprietary information to a competitor. In the company newsletter he reads an article praising a warehouse employee who blew the whistle on coworkers involved in ongoing merchandise theft. A second article, written by the chief executive officer, reminds employees that the unethical behavior of one of the firm’s competitors became headline news in the national press. The employee’s last task of the day is to sit in on an interview for a prospective team member. After the interview is over, the employee’s supervisor asks him if the candidate appeared honest, with a strong work ethic.

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1 Underlying the control framework developed in this paper are presumptions that organizational leaders are interested in control for the purposes of organizational effectiveness and efficiency and that, in the aggregate, the relatively less powerful members of the organization participate somewhat willingly in control processes and systems, and in the network of power relations, because they expect the outcomes of control (e.g., order, motivation, productivity) to potentially be beneficial to the common good. Theorists from certain critical traditions, of course, dispute these presumptions. Proponents of a Marxist perspective, for example, describe control in terms of the ongoing conflict between classes in society—as the ruling class exploits the working class and attempts to stifle workers’ just resistance (Braverman, 1974).
These and a wide variety of other corruption controls commonly are used concurrently in the contemporary organization, but they typically are studied in isolation from one another (e.g., Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 2001; Graham, 1986; Near & Miceli, 1987; Treviño & Youngblood, 1990). Yet, since some control types will work well in concert because they share theoretical assumptions, whereas others will work at cross purposes because they do not, it is important to understand both theoretically and practically the interrelationships among types. For instance, organizational attempts to manipulate the extrinsic consequences of corrupt actions might lessen the internal drive of employees to maintain their own high ethical standards (cf. Deci, 1995; Frey, 1997). Likewise, controls that rely on bureaucratic behavioral restrictions appear inconsistent with, or even contradictory to, approaches that attempt to engender a sense of mutual responsibility for value-based ethical behavior. Top-down approaches to structuring work and enforcing rules appear inconsistent with approaches that attempt to foster shared interpretations of organizational life and the development of common expectations and value-based norms and sanctions (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985).

As an illustration of this last point, consider the academic setting and the problem of scholastic dishonesty among college students. McCabe and Treviño (1993) have suggested that one way of combating this particular form of corruption is the development of an environment in which scholastic dishonesty is socially unacceptable. Students surveyed by McCabe and Treviño (1993) at schools ostensibly having such an environment alluded to a partnership among student, peers, and school in defining and maintaining moral behavior. In contrast, the responses of students at schools with high levels of self-reported cheating were more indicative of an us-versus-them environment, in which cheating was seen by the students as both acceptable and deserved by faculty and administration (McCabe & Treviño, 1993). This contrast suggests that corruption control methods that emphasize and make salient the us-versus-them nature of the control relationship (e.g., proctoring of tests and exams, requiring students to report even minor observed infractions to faculty) could contradict and undermine the effectiveness of control methods intended to foster a sense of shared responsibility for academic integrity (e.g., signing of honor pledges by both faculty and students, encouraging students to confront peer dishonesty on a student-to-student level as a first and possibly only step).

The model I develop in this paper provides a theoretical basis for scholarly exploration of the tensions, contradictions, and complementarities that might exist among the array of corruption controls widely in use. I begin with two dimensions of control that appear—but typically are not integrated—in the organizational control literature. Next, I conceptually distinguish between corruption control and the broader category of organizational control and employ that distinction to consider the functionalities of different corruption control types. These underlying dimensions and functionalities provide the basis for a conceptual framework. Using that framework, I then organize corruption controls according to type. The centerpiece of this paper is the resulting typology of organizational corruption control. This typology not only represents a new way to integrate the literature but also, as I detail in the discussion section, provides a conceptual context for understanding corruption control types alone and in combination, thus offering a theoretical foundation for further scholarly exploration and practical implementation of organizational corruption control.

CONTROL DIMENSIONS

To build a conceptual framework for understanding the differences and similarities among corruption control types, I start with two fundamental distinctions that scholars have developed in the organizational control literature. The first is between controls oriented toward outcome and those oriented toward process (March & Simon, 1958; Ouchi & Maguire, 1975). The second is between controls transmitted through administrative channels and those transmitted through social/cultural channels (Johnson & Gill, 1993; Ouchi, 1979). While there are many different approaches to the subject of organizational control (e.g., see reviews in Cardinal, Sitkin, & Long, 2004, and Flamholtz, Das, & Tsui, 1985), these two distinctions emerge as particularly useful organizing schemes. Separately, the orientation and transmission channel dimensions are practically relevant and theoretically
important ways of distinguishing among controls. (Later in this paper, I supplement these two dimensions with a third factor critical for distinguishing among controls—namely, their intended function.) Subsumed under each of these dimensions are all types of control used in organizations, and since the dimensions are orthogonal, they can be integrated to provide finer-grained distinctions among types.

**Orientation—Outcome or Process**

Scholars in the organizational control literature have argued that organizational leaders target controls either at outcomes or at the antecedent behaviors associated with those outcomes (cf. Eisenhardt, 1985; Merchant, 1985; Ouchi, 1977, 1978). Outcome-oriented controls are measures that either attempt to influence current behavior through the promise of consequences—such as future rewards (or punishments) that are tied to desired (or undesired) results of current behavior—or attempt to eradicate corruption that has emerged. Process-oriented controls are measures that involve active intervention prior to and during the conduct of work, with the goal of ensuring that individuals are acting in the organization’s interest.

The distinction between outcome- and process-oriented control is apparent in an often-used application of agency theory that describes methods for attempting to ensure that the behavior of the agent complies with the wishes of the principal. In this application of the theory, the interests of powerful managers—the agents—are thought to likely diverge from the interests of the firm’s shareholders—the principals (Zajac & Westphal, 2002). A process-oriented method for resolving this agency problem entails ongoing monitoring of the upper-level managers’ behavior (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). For example, to attempt to ensure that the chief executive is not engaging the firm in subcontracts that benefit the executive personally at the expense of shareholders, the directors might require prior board approval and ongoing board oversight of any contracts in which the executive personally is an interested party. An outcome-oriented method for resolving the agency problem—which is preferred, all else being equal, because of its typically lower costs—entails creating economic incentives that attempt to align the interests of upper-level managers with those of shareholders (Zajac & Westphal, 2002). For example, the board might structure executive pay to be contingent on firm financial performance, with the expectation that executives will avoid corrupt behavior because it might hinder firm performance and jeopardize the contingent pay. Additionally, the board has another outcome-oriented control at its disposal: the termination of a manager’s employment contract.

**Transmission Channels—Social/Cultural or Administrative**

Aside from its orientation, another important characteristic of a given control is its means of transmission. Here again, an essential dichotomy is available from the organizational control literature—in this case between controls transmitted along social/cultural channels and those transmitted along administrative channels (cf. Cyr & Welbourne, 1997; Hopwood, 1974; Johnson & Gill, 1993; Ouchi, 1979, 1980). Social/cultural controls are carried by the beliefs, values, and norms in the organization. They operate through normative pressures and the force of social obligation. For example, an employee may hesitate to steal from petty cash for fear of being ostracized by coworkers. Administrative controls, in contrast, while also conducted and interpreted in a social context, are transmitted by formal structures and routines, particularly through hierarchies of authority internal and external to the organization. Administrative controls operate through the force of coercion and the formal manipulation of rewards and punishments. For example, a bank teller may be reluctant to pocket money from the cash drawer, fearing both the disciplinary procedures of the bank, up to and including termination, and the possibility of criminal prosecution.

Some scholars of organizational control have treated administrative controls as those that are intentionally designed and social controls as those that emerge unintentionally through the social interactions of organizational members (e.g., Johnson & Gill, 1993). In this paper I do not base the distinction on intentionality. Instead, I argue that organizational leaders can purposively manipulate administrative structures and organizational cultural carriers with the objective of corruption control.
Relationship Between Orientation and Transmission Channel Dimensions

As described above, we can understand a given corruption control type as being oriented toward either outcome or process, or as being transmitted via either social/cultural or administrative channels. To begin to construct an organizing framework based on these two dimensions, it is useful to consider that the location of a given control type on the orientation dimension is not dependent on its location on the transmission channel dimension, and vice versa. Instead, as pictured in Figure 1, those dimensions overlap to form a $2 \times 2$ matrix, encompassing in its four cells all types of corruption control. In the next section I complete the conceptual framework by overlaying onto this matrix another dimension based on the functionality of corruption control types.

DISTINGUISHING CORRUPTION CONTROL

To continue to build the conceptual framework for understanding the differences and similarities among corruption control types, it is valuable to distinguish between corruption control and the broader category of organizational control. Interestingly, although this distinction is important to the comprehensive treatment of corruption control in this paper, it has not been essential to past research that has treated corruption controls in relative isolation from one another.

In order to differentiate between corruption control in particular and organizational control in general, I start with the definition of organizational control that Cardinal (2001) used to sum up numerous studies in the organizational control literature. According to that definition, organizational control is "any process by which managers direct attention, motivate, and encourage organizational members to act in desired ways to meet the firm’s objectives" (Cardinal, 2001: 22). In other words, organizational control is intended to minimize deviance that will interfere with cooperation among members and efficiency in work processes. A way of distinguishing corruption control from the more general category of organizational control, then, is that the former is directed in particular at deviance that is intentional and opportunistic, whereas the latter is directed at deviance in general. Stated another way, corruption control emphasizes the minimization of an undesirable state (intentional maleficence), while organizational control in general emphasizes the maximization of a desirable state (cooperation and efficiency).

This is not a complex distinction, yet it has two important uses. First, it explains at a conceptual level why some means of control discussed in the organizational control literature are not subsumed under the two dimensions that I described above as inclusive of all types of corruption control. Notable in this regard is the market (or price) channel of control transmission (Ouchi, 1979, 1980), which assumes an environment of fair play and therefore is not central to the minimization of intentional maleficence. Second, it leads to analysis of why people do or do not intentionally act opportunistically and, thus, to consideration of how corruption control types differ in terms of functionality, as I explore next.

Function

If the goal of corruption control is to combat intentional self-serving deviant behavior, it is important to consider how different control types do so. I argue that each of the many dif-
ifferent approaches to corruption control serves one of four dominant functions: (1) autonomy reduction, in which the organization circumscribes the member’s freedom to perform certain actions; (2) consequence systems, in which formal organizational reward and punishment systems influence the member’s behaviors; (3) environmental sanctioning, in which the organization interprets and transmits to the member external pressures for legal/regulatory compliance and social conformity; and (4) intrinsically oriented controls, in which the organization fosters and facilitates the member’s own inclinations to reject corrupt behavior. As I describe next, each of these four functions is guided by relevant and different assumptions about why organizational members would engage in or avoid corrupt behavior.

Underlying the autonomy reduction function is the assumption that, in the aggregate, unconstrained behavior will result in corrupt behavior. Similar to all four assumptions I present in this section, this assumption is not without some empirical basis. For example, it is supported by research that relates individual differences among employees—such as differences in the stage of cognitive moral development, locus of control (Treviño & Youngblood, 1990), Machiavellianism (Hegarty & Sims, 1978), and social dominance orientation (Sidanious & Pratto, 1999)—to variance in tendencies toward unethical and self-interested action. One resulting expectation is that certain people are prone to situationally unethical behavior (Merchant, 1985). In other words, given the chance to engage in opportunism, some people will rationalize the ethical considerations—for example, by viewing the action as redress for inequitable treatment by the employer—and proceed to act opportunistically (Greenberg, 1993).

A second and very different assumption underlies the consequence system function of corruption control—namely, that predictable human responses to external stimuli cause human behavior. Here the role of individual differences in leading to corrupt behavior is deemphasized. Instead, organizational leaders presume that each individual comes to the organization with the potential to act in many different ways, including ways that differ significantly from organizational objectives. The assumption is that the individual’s interactions with the behavioral consequences available within the organization shape his or her behavior. Consequently, organizational leaders attempt to diagnose and manipulate behavior-consequence linkages. A large body of research supports the assumption that behavior depends on its consequences, either via learning processes or because the perceived consequences actively influence choice (e.g., Lawler, 1973; Luthans & Kreitner, 1985).

A third assumption, also independent from the others, underlies the environmental sanctioning function of corruption control. This assumption is that the pressures—normative and coercive—existing in the organization’s broader social and regulative context will necessarily permeate the organization’s borders to affect the behavior of its members. Operating under this assumption, organizational leaders presume that the social pressures or legal/regulative sanctions applied by forces external to the organization can cause members to avoid corrupt behaviors. Organizational leaders therefore attempt to diagnose and manipulate the linkages between behaviors internal to the organization and evaluations and consequences emanating from the organization’s environment. This assumption is rooted in an open systems perspective, which emphasizes the organization’s relationship with and adaptation to its environment (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Scott, 2002).

Underlying the intrinsically oriented corruption control function is a final independent assumption, which is that individuals can find the avoidance of corrupt behavior to be an inherently satisfying end in itself, rather than simply a means to satisfying extrinsic consequences (Deci, 1975). Employees who are motivated intrinsically to avoid corrupt behavior do so because they have internalized the values associated with ethical behavior, or because ethical behavior has become integral to their identities (Aquino & Reed, 2002). A nearly pure form of such an intrinsic drive would be the conscious decision to eschew an easy opportunity for corrupt gain, even though no one but the individual involved would ever know.

The Resulting Conceptual Framework

Above I identified four functions of corruption control and explored how they are conceptually distinct from each other because of their different underlying assumptions. I now can complete the conceptual framework by describing how
those function categories overlay the two dimensions—orientation and transmission channel—that I presented previously. As I explain next, and as pictured in Figure 2, I derive the location of the function categories on the $2 \times 2$ matrix (orientation by transmission channel) from a consideration of how each function category involves those two dimensions.

In Figure 2 the four function categories are labeled as quadrants, each wholly located in one half (top, bottom, left, or right) of the $2 \times 2$ matrix (orientation by transmission channel) and each splitting another half of the matrix. As is evident from Figure 2, the effect of superimposing the four function quadrants onto the $2 \times 2$ matrix is to divide each of the function quadrants into two subcategories according to the intersection of the orientation and transmission channel dimensions. These divisions result in eight distinct yet conceptually interlinked corruption control types, as I detail later.

Quadrant I contains the autonomy reduction controls. These controls clearly are oriented toward behavioral processes and are located in that half. This quadrant spans both the social/cultural and administrative halves of the matrix because autonomy reduction can have a basis of compliance rooted in either social obligation or bureaucratic expedience. That distinction becomes more apparent when I explicate the control types in the next section.

Quadrant II contains the controls involving consequence systems internal to the organization. Consequence systems are official and implemented within the organization as part of its administrative structure and hierarchy of authority. Consequently, this sector is located within the administrative half of the matrix. This quadrant straddles the process-outcome split, since some consequence systems attempt to shape behavior as it is occurring and others attempt to shape behavior by influencing outcome expectancies (Treviño & Youngblood, 1990).

Quadrant III contains the environmental controls. Individuals under the influence of these controls refrain from corrupt behaviors in order to avoid social sanctions or legal/regulative punishments. Those two pressures emanate from evaluators external to the organization and are transmitted through the social/cultural or administrative channels in the organization, re-
spectively. Consequently, this quadrant straddles the social/cultural-administrative split on the matrix. Environmental pressures are located in the outcome half of the matrix because although they influence behavioral processes, they do so through the expectation that actors in the environment will ultimately evaluate the outcomes of internal organization behaviors.

Finally, Quadrant IV contains the intrinsically oriented controls. The means of control included here are the social influences within the organization that affect individual members’ attitudes toward corrupt behavior in themselves or other members. Thus, this quadrant is located on the social/cultural half of the matrix. The quadrant is split across the process-outcome divide to reflect the difference between intrinsically oriented means of control that are based on the individual’s vigilance about the emergence of corruption in the organization (outcome) and those that are based on the individual’s control of his or her own behavior (process).

As pictorially represented in Figure 2, the resulting typology is a circular array, or circumplex. The circumplex structure originated in early work on factor analysis (Guttman, 1954). Since its introduction, that graphical structure has at times been appropriated by theorists to represent a typology derived from theorizing, rather than as a factor analysis tool (e.g., McGrath, 1984). I find it advantageous to join this tradition of appropriation for two reasons. First, the circumplex is useful for an impartial presentation of types, since I do not intend for the typology to point to ways that types might be rank ordered. Like the circumplex, the typology has no conceptually based beginning or end. Second, the circumplex is particularly useful for presenting the control types since it allows for the representation of commonalities between neighboring types according to multiple dimensions. In the next section I flesh out this typology by providing a description for, and some examples of, each of the types.

**TYPOLOGY OF CORRUPTION CONTROL**

**Bureaucratic Controls (Type 1)**

As mentioned, the circumplex does not imply rank order; consequently, the numbering of types is for convenience of reference only. I start with bureaucratic controls because they have a long tradition of scholarly exploration (e.g., Merton, 1957; Perrow, 1967; Weber, 1947) and because they are culturally dominant (Cardinal, 2001). Therefore, they are a familiar place from which to launch the explication of types.

Bureaucratic controls standardize work processes (Mintzberg, 1979) and include formalized rules, routines, and policies; hierarchical and centralized structures; and specialization of jobs (Child, 1973; Edwards, 1979; Ouchi, 1979; Weber, 1947). These means of control constrain the range of employees’ behaviors, make their actions predictable, and increase the likelihood that behaviors will be consistent with organizational objectives (Johnson & Gill, 1993). It bears reiteration that the perspective reflected in this paper is that the exercise of bureaucratic and other corruption controls has a legitimacy founded in the acquiescence of organizational members to be controlled in order to protect the interests of the majority from the otherwise presumably destructive behavior of the deviant minority.

Employees comply with employer expectations for allowable behavior because it is expedient to do so. Patterns of behavior dictated by bureaucratic controls become routinized and taken for granted (March & Simon, 1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982), and employees conform to procedures because they provide the path of least resistance for accomplishing the task at hand. In contrast, in the neighboring punishment type of control, which is also both process oriented and administratively channeled, employees conform to expectations because a system of punishments shapes their behavior. In the neighboring concertive type of control, which, like bureaucratic control, is process oriented and functions by restricting individual autonomy, employees conform to expectations out of social obligation enforced by peers.

Physical limits on employee action are included in the bureaucratic controls category because the legitimacy of those physical constraints is rooted in bureaucratic rationality. For example, to control corrupt activities, organizational leaders use locks on desks and passwords on databases, and they restrict access to areas that house valuable materials and data (Merchant, 1985). Bureaucratic means of corruption control also include nonphysical administrative limits on an individual’s freedom to perform specific tasks. These limits, as described
by Merchant (1985), include (1) centralization of decision making; (2) separation of duties; (3) pre-action review, in which decisions cannot be implemented until reviewed by parties not involved in the planning; (4) authorization ceilings; and (5) postaction review, such as auditing and peer review.

Punishment (Type 2)

Punishment means of corruption control are based on the premise that people learn from the consequences of their behaviors (Davis & Luthans, 1980). Learning is evidenced by modification of behavior (Luthans & Kreitner, 1985). As I use the term here, punishment refers to systems of behavior shaping that associate an employee’s corrupt behavior with organizational consequences undesirable to the employee.

To use punishment to control corruption, organizational leaders diagnose and actively manage behavior-consequence linkages. This entails identifying corrupt behaviors, the punishments that organization leaders potentially can link to those behaviors, and the reinforcements that potentially can be linked to uncorrupt replacement behaviors. Luthan and Kreitner’s (1985) five steps for establishing an organizational behavior change program are useful in considering how organizations might implement punishment means of corruption control. First, organizational leaders define a target corrupt behavior, such as pilferage among night shift workers in a retail establishment. Second, the organizational leaders measure the frequency of the behavior in order to obtain a baseline against which to measure the success of the change effort. Third, they make the performance objective clear to employees—in the current example, the objective might be that employees pay for any merchandise before removing it from the building—as well as the consequences attached to failure to comply with the performance objective. For example, the punishment for pilferage might be suspension from work. Fourth, the organizational leaders devise a method for monitoring the behavior. For instance, the retail establishment managers might use security cameras to monitor employee performance. Finally, the organizational leaders administer punishments according to the behaviors observed.

Because punishment systems emphasize observable and measurable behavior—and because of the difficulty of observing and measuring behavior (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997)—the usefulness of those systems for corruption control is bounded. Incentive alignments, which I discuss next, while also consequence systems transmitted administratively, do not rely on ongoing monitoring of behavior. Rather, they are oriented toward outputs resulting from behavior.

Incentive Alignments (Type 3)

Similar to the punishment means of control, incentive alignments focus on extrinsic motivations for behavior. However, whereas punishment intervenes in the conduct of work and attempts to shape behavior through a learning process involving monitoring and feedback, incentive alignments attempt to ensure that employees have a stake in achieving the outcomes the organization’s leaders seek (Baker, 2002). This means of control is familiar in the design of compensation plans for top managers—for example, via organization-performance-contingent compensation contracting, stock option pay, and stock ownership (Sanders, 2001; Westphal & Zajac, 1994)—but it is also applied in compensation for other employees (Gerhart, Minkoff, & Olsen, 1995). In the latter case, the challenge is to align the interests of the managers—representing the principals in agency theory—with those of their employees—representing agents (Gerhart et al., 1995). For example, organizational leaders might attempt to align employee and organizational interests with employee profit-sharing plans or stock option grants to employees, or by otherwise facilitating employee ownership of firm assets (Conte & Svejnar, 1988).

Whether the subjects are management or non-management employees, when those employees have a stake in organizational outcomes, they have an incentive to avoid diverting organizational resources and organizational routines needed to meet those outcomes. Consequently, incentive alignment has possible utility for controlling employee corruption directed against the organization. However, organizational corruption also includes acts conducted on behalf of the organization (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Coleman, 1987). Since incentive alignment gives
employees a strong vested interest to bolster firm performance, it ironically might encourage this latter type of corruption (Dukerich, Lange, & Huber, 2005).

Legal/regulatory sanctioning, which I discuss next, also is oriented toward the outputs resulting from behavior and also is transmitted along administrative channels, but, unlike incentive alignments, legal/regulatory sanctioning functions with the promise of extrinsic consequences ultimately delivered by evaluators external to the organization.

**Legal/Regulatory Sanctioning (Type 4)**

One facet of an organization’s legal environment is regulatory, meaning that it seeks to control organizational behavior (Edelman & Suchman, 1997). As such, the law is a system of substantive edicts, invoking societal authority over various aspects of organizational life. The rhetoric, if not the reality, of regulation is one of top-down sovereign control: The legal system (presumably on society’s behalf) is taking the initiative directly to modify organizational behavior (Edelman & Suchman, 1997: 483).

Under the theory of deterrence, rational decision makers are dissuaded from engaging in corrupt acts if the regulatory system provides a punishment that is certain and severe enough (Coleman, 1987; Edelman & Suchman, 1997).

Here again, it is useful to distinguish between corruption against and on behalf of the organization. The legal environment might be relatively more effective as a control for the former than for the latter. For corruption directed against the organization, the legal environment labels some activities—such as embezzlement—illegal that are deleterious to the organization’s legitimate functions. This empowers organizational leaders to invoke the threat of more severe punishments—such as jail time and fines—than those available within the organization. However, when corruption is on behalf of the organization, research suggests three reasons why the deterrent value of the regulatory environment may be diminished (Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Jowell, 1975; Katz, 1977; Stone, 1975). First, individuals are rarely held accountable for corporate misdeeds. Second, the punishments (usually fines) applied to corporations are seldom large relative to firm size. Third, an organization often can hide wrongdoing from external review.

Still, it is evident that the administrative structures of the organization are crucial in interpreting and transmitting the regulatory environment pressures—for example, by creating an inverse relationship between the hierarchical level of the employee and the likelihood of criminal prosecution for wrongdoing—and therefore in influencing how external pressures ultimately affect employee behavior (Coleman, 1987; Scott, 2001). In this way, legal/regulatory sanctioning differs from social sanctioning, the control type I discuss next. Both types originate in the organization’s environment and both are oriented toward the outcomes of organizational member behavior, but while legal/regulatory sanctioning is mediated by the administrative structures in the organization, social sanctioning is mediated by the social/cultural carriers.

**Social Sanctioning (Type 5)**

Expected external judgments that are not part of the legal/regulatory environment also influence individual behavior in the organization. All organizations, even those immersed in an external culture of intense competition, rely for their continued existence on an ongoing social coordination of dependencies with other actors in the environment. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) noted, interorganizational norms develop by social consensus and dictate acceptable types of action that result in stable patterns of behavior and coordinated interdependencies among entities. Such norms apply to actions that affect trust and predictability among actors and establish mutually understood standards of behavior for exchange relationships. “Despite the strong support the economic system provides for the ideals of competitive individualism, it is clear that the pursuit of economic self-interest must be contained within some normative boundaries—or social and economic chaos would be the ultimate result” (Coleman, 1987: 421).

Consequently, the external environment is replete with judgments about whether the externally visible outcomes of individual action within the organization comply with the generally understood rules for honesty, fairness, and ethical behavior. These judgments might be made officially—for example, by trade associations or accrediting bodies associated with pro-
essions—or they might be made unofficially—such as when an individual is stigmatized because of prior unethical behavior (Goffman, 1963; Jones et al., 1984; Scott, 2002). Employees comply with the socially constructed rules to maintain legitimacy in specific social roles, as well as to maintain the rights and privileges associated with those roles. In other words, they are compelled by the extrinsic consequences associated with the externally observable outcomes of their behaviors in the organization. In contrast, in the neighboring vigilance type of controls—also both outcome oriented and transmitted by social/cultural carriers—employees are intrinsically motivated to dissent from observed corruption, without respect to the judgments of evaluators.

Just as the organization mediates the effect of the external legal/regulatory environment on the behaviors of organizational members, it also mediates the effect of external social sanctioning on those behaviors. There is tension within organizations, as in society in general, between the norms for ethical behavior and the value of competitive individualism (Coleman, 1987). The clash of these cultural forces is negotiated on an ongoing basis in the organization’s social environment—for example, through the “ethical tone” of the organization—which supports or devalues the external normative standards for behavior (Clinard & Yeager, 1980: 60). As Treviño, Brown, and Pincus-Hartman have noted, based on their qualitative study of perceptions of ethical leadership, observers “notice when an executive walks the talk and acts on concerns for the common good, society as a whole, and the long term, because executives are expected to be focused on the financial bottom line and the short-term demands of stock analysts” (2003: 28).

Ethical tone is established, in part, by managers’ initiating symbolic communications and actions that influence what external evaluations are most salient to employees (Pfeffer, 1981). In so doing, organizational leaders influence the ways in which and the degree to which pressure from external evaluators controls employee behavior. Other organizational actions that expose members to external social evaluations include the pursuit and maintenance of accreditation (e.g., JCAHO in health care organizations, ISO in industry, AACSB in business schools); the pursuit of awards (e.g., J.D. Power and Associates, Baldrige); and the dissemination of information about individual employee performance, such as in newsletters, annual reports, and press releases.

**Vigilance Controls (Type 6)**

Corruption that emerges from the amoral pursuit of a legitimate organizational goal, such as cost savings or competitive advantage, is particularly difficult to control (Dukerich et al., 2005). Emergent corruption might be stifled at the process level through bureaucratic controls, concertive controls, or punishment systems, but often it is not evident at the process level. Instead, organizational leaders can attempt to control emergent corruption by giving employees the autonomy and encouragement to raise objections to corruption after it appears. Organizational scholars have variously referred to such objections as functional disobedience (Brief et al., 2001), constructive deviance (Warren, 2003), and principled organizational dissent (Graham, 1986). Specific means of dissent have also been explicated—for example, whistleblowing (Near & Miceli, 1987) and “voice” extrarole behaviors (Van Dyne & LePine, 1998).

In contrast to concertive controls, discussed below, vigilance means of corruption control do not concern the monitoring and enforcement of group norms. Rather, they concern the likelihood that employees will depart from group norms in ways that ultimately are constructive for the organization (Warren, 2003). Vigilance controls require strong intrinsic motivation, since employees who express dissent must overcome social pressure to conform (Warren, 2003).

Organizational leaders facilitate the use of vigilance controls by attempting to foster a culture that supports constructive deviance. To do so, managers might engage in symbolic acts, such as celebrating those who blow the whistle on corrupt behavior (Near & Miceli, 1987). Graham (1986) has described some features of an organizational culture that supports constructive deviance, including (1) a focus on the necessity of dissent to enable continuous organizational learning, (2) respect for individual conscience, (3) maximization of interpersonal trust, and (4) encouragement of innovative rather than custodial responses to work roles (Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). Brief et al. have described a culture of honest and open peer discourse that “supports the critical discussion
of instructions from above, thereby facilitating the articulation of misgivings, the reinforcement of doubts and the analyses of how to respond” (2001: 493), and which therefore helps dissenters discover like-minded others who also are troubled by the course of events. Finally, vigilance controls require employees to be socialized to be aware of global ethical norms that may differ from the local norms for behavior in the organization (Donaldson & Dunfee [1999] refer to these global ethical norms as hypernorms)—and to be loyal not only to the organization but also to the organization’s various stakeholders (Brief et al., 2001).

Organizational leaders also facilitate the use of vigilance controls by educating and training employees in practical ethics. Through ethics education programs, employees can learn about the global ethical norms that will provide the basis for future vigilant departure from group norms. However, as Gioia notes, the complexity of organizational life lends itself to scripted cognitive processing, in which salient and available knowledge frameworks allow for “virtually effortless interpretation of information and events” (1992: 385). These cognitive shortcuts to understanding and deciding on appropriate action are efficient but can crowd out broader ethical considerations that exist outside of the script (Gioia, 1992). Organizational education and training programs in practical ethics can teach or train employees how to break or revise a script when cues point to the need for explicit attention to ethical issues (Gioia, 1992, 2002).

Self-Controls (Type 7)

Similar to the vigilance controls described previously, self-controls are subject to social/cultural influences in the organization, and they are voluntary at the level of individual motivation. In other words, they are not directly dependent on extrinsic rewards or costs, and they are not constrained by organizational structures or horizontal monitoring. However, whereas vigilance controls entail constructive deviance in reaction to corrupt outcomes, self-controls entail individual constructive conformity. Constructive conformity is possible when organizational norms are congruent with hypernorms (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999; Warren, 2003). Organizational leaders maximize self-control by inspiring employees to voluntarily strive for constructive conformity—to continually monitor and correct their own behavior in accordance with those hypernorms.

The distinction between organizational identification and the internalization of organizational values and beliefs (Kelman, 1961; O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986; Pratt, 1998) offers two explanations for how employees are so inspired. With respect to organizational identification, some scholars have emphasized value congruence between individual and organization as a key feature (Pratt, 1998), whereas other scholars have emphasized the cognitive nature of identification. Among the latter are Dutton, Dukerich, and Harquail, who say that employees who identify strongly with the organization have a close psychological attachment that results from “adopt[ing] the defining characteristics of the organization as defining characteristics for themselves” (1994: 242). In either view, individuals with strong organizational identification receive identity-relevant information from membership in the organization. When that identity-relevant information is favorable, individuals will be motivated to act in ways that help the organization (Tyler, 1999). Because an individual’s self-definition is closely tied to his or her perception of the organization’s definition, the avoidance of action that is deleterious to the organization, such as corrupt behavior, is a matter of self-identity preservation. I should note, however, that if a member perceives the interests of the organization to diverge from those of outside stakeholders, strong identification might more effectively control corruption against rather than on behalf of the organization—a consequence included in descriptions of the “dark side” of organizational identification (Dukerich, Kramer, & McLean-Parks, 1998).

Whereas organizational identification has to do with social membership and is perhaps motivated by the needs to belong and to be liked, internalization of values and beliefs has to do with the content of those values and beliefs and is motivated by the need to be right (Kelman, 1961; Pratt, 1998). Pratt sharpens the distinction this way: “Internalization is associated with embracing others’ values and beliefs more deeply than in identification, thus resulting in more permanent and fundamental changes within an individual” (1998: 176). Employees who have internalized values that are antithetical to corrupt behavior will attempt to avoid those behaviors
simply because it is inherently the right thing to do.

O’Reilly and Chatman (1996) have described three steps that strong culture organizations use to develop a normative order characterized by social control. Organizational leaders may use these steps both to foster organizational identification and to encourage employee internalization of organizational values and beliefs. First, strong culture organizations “promote commitment through participation” (1996: 175). This includes rigorous selection, initial orientation, and regular training processes that serve both to screen in employees who already have values and beliefs congruent with those of the organization and to involve employees in “incremental and public commitment to subscribe to an explicit set of norms” (1996: 177). Second, strong culture organizations manage information contexts to foster shared interpretations of events among members. Management continually sends unambiguous signals—often symbolically—that reiterate important organizational values and expected employee behavior. Third, leaders in these organizations frequently use recognition, celebration, and group approval to reinforce the attitudes and behaviors that reflect alignment with organizational values.

All three of these means for developing a normative order include intense and prolonged employee contact with the organization that highlights its attractiveness and distinctiveness, as well as processes that enhance member self-esteem—all of which lead to emulation of organizational value systems and increased organizational identification (Dutton et al., 1994; O’Reilly & Chatman, 1996). In turn, high levels of organizational identification and internalization of organizational values constitute a durable and extensive form of control (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1996) that increases the degree to which employees are inspired to self-control corrupt behavior.

Finally, although organizational identification or internalization of organizational values and beliefs may inspire employees toward constructive conformity, their cognitive processing is still apt to follow organizational scripts (as described in the previous section), not all of which incorporate ethical considerations. Organizational leaders can facilitate self-controls with practical ethical education and training to encourage employees to develop and use scripts that incorporate explicit consideration of the ethical implications involved when the script is enacted (Gioia, 1992). Moreover, ethics education or training can give employees practical cues for when it is important to break or revise scripts because of ethical considerations (Gioia, 1992); this can facilitate an employee’s attempts to monitor and correct his or her own behavior, just as it can facilitate his or her efforts to break from social norms and be vigilant about emergent corruption.

**Concertive Controls (Type 8)**

Concertive controls are relatively new to the literature and are posited to be concomitant with the rise of the postbureaucratic organization (e.g., Tompkins & Cheney, 1985). Like the neighboring bureaucratic controls, concertive controls function by reducing autonomy, but unlike bureaucratic controls, autonomy reduction is not the result of the rules and structures promulgated by the organizational hierarchy. Rather, concertive controls reduce autonomy through the parameters of acceptable behavior that develop as a “negotiated consensus” among workers (Barker, 1993: 412). When controlled by concertive means, employees understand the locus of authority—the source of control that they see as legitimate and to which they are willing to submit (Barker, 1993; Whitely, 1977)—as residing in “the value consensus of the members and its socially created generative rules system,” rather than in the bureaucracy, with its “rational-legal constitutive rules” (Barker, 1993: 412).

When influenced by concertive controls, workers willingly subjugate themselves to a pressure that rationalizes work and ensures controlled collective action but that, unlike bureaucratization, emerges socially rather than from formal organizational structure. Workers comply with peer demands for appropriate work behavior because of social obligation and the normative pressures that result from both arriving at shared interpretations with other workers on core values and reaching a consensus on how to shape behavior (Barker, 1993).

Concertive controls entail horizontal surveillance (Sewell, 1998), by which individual autonomy is restricted as coworkers actively monitor established behavioral norms. Violations of consensus-driven norms result in sanctioning by
coworkers (Wright & Barker, 2000). This team policing aspect of concertive control distinguishes it from the neighboring self-controls. Like self-controls, concertive controls are process oriented and transmitted along social/cultural channels. Unlike self-controls, which are intrinsically oriented and which function by increasing the likelihood that autonomous behavior will be congruent with organizational objectives, concertive controls are extrinsically oriented and governed by the pursuit of moral approbation (Jones & Ryan, 1997) and the avoidance of censure.

Consideration of how organizations might foster concertive means of corruption control raises the inherent paradox that by enhancing employee autonomy it is possible to constrain employee autonomy. Organizational leaders cultivate concertive control by supporting worker participation in decision making and problem solving (Barker, 1999). In so doing, employers prompt employees to (1) develop a group interpretation and consensus on the key values relevant to the work, (2) develop expectations for one another with respect to proper behavior based on those values, and (3) formalize those value-based norms into behavioral rules and into peer enforcement means of enforcing those rules (Wright & Barker, 2000). For example, a work team might develop a consensus that the personal use of company equipment (e.g., computers, photocopiers, faxes) is inappropriate because it is inconsistent with team values. The team might build on this consensus to instill generally understood rules for behavior among members (i.e., “this is how we use equipment on our team”), and then monitor equipment use to ensure that all members comply.

**DISCUSSION**

A key argument here has been that corruption control types are complex constructs best viewed in the multidimensional context of organizational corruption control overall. The typology illuminates that context by describing the conceptual similarities and distinctions among different means of corruption control. This perspective represents a significant departure from prior research, which typically has treated corruption control types in isolation, and it has important implications for theory, research, and practice.

**Theoretical Implications**

The multidimensional conceptualization of corruption control and the resulting circumplex typology extend prior research in several ways. First, since this model distinguishes conceptually among the entire array of corruption control types, and since it makes a sharper distinction between corruption control and the broader category of organizational control than has been made before, it offers a unique synthesis from the literature of discrete theoretical statements about corruption control. The circumplex therefore lends itself to exploring research questions about the main effects of a given corruption control type. Accordingly, a set of main effect hypotheses can be distilled from the circumplex for each of the eight corruption control types. For instance, a hypothesis drawn from the typology with respect to the vigilance type is that, statistically controlling for the amount of emergent corruption in an organizational setting, the amount of vigilance control implemented will be positively related to the amount of constructive deviance among employees in reaction to that corruption. The circumplex also lends itself to exploring research questions about the comparative efficacy of control types. For instance, another hypothesis drawn from the typology is that, relative to increases in bureaucratic control, increases in concertive control are more effective (or, alternatively, less effective) in suppressing subsequent corruption.

While the circumplex offers an array of theoretical statements about the main effects of corruption control, its second important contribution is—by showing each type in the context of the other corruption control types—to lay the foundation for theorizing about the types in combination. The multidimensional conceptualization of corruption control provides the basis for exploring research questions about how certain dependent variables, such as the manifestation of organizational corruption, are affected by the interaction among corruption control types used simultaneously, owing to clashes or complementarities in their underlying dimensions and functionalities. For instance, a proposed clash between the motivating effect of extrinsic consequences and intrinsic rewards might lead to a hypothesis predicting that, relative to organizational settings with low levels of punishment control systems, in settings with high levels of
punishment control systems, organizational efforts to foster self-controls will be less effective in suppressing corruption. This is one of many interaction effects that can be hypothesized based on the eight conceptually distinct corruption control types available in the circumplex. I explore this contribution in more detail in the next section.

A third theoretical contribution is to show how bureaucracy fits into the broader context of all corruption control. In theoretical and empirical work, as well as in practice, organizational control traditionally has been biased toward a focus on bureaucratic control (Cardinal, 2001). Bureaucratic control is rooted in the formalized rules and procedures, centralized decision making, and hierarchy that are salient features of most contemporary organizations (Edwards, 1979). Consequently, it is not surprising that managers and researchers, who necessarily are embedded in those organizational structures and routines, may often associate control with bureaucracy. Still, as is evident in this paper, many means of control used in organizations and studied by researchers cannot readily be described as bureaucratic. Furthermore, bureaucracy alone cannot account for the incompatibilities and complementarities that may be associated with corruption controls. The model in this paper helps to place bureaucratic control within the context of the entire array of corruption control means.

The circumplex allows for both a loose and a narrow definition of bureaucracy as related to corruption control. Defined loosely, bureaucracy is tantamount to administrative channels of transmission and, thus, encompasses Types 1, 2, 3 and 4. The circumplex therefore illustrates how bureaucracy, which might otherwise appear to be a single phenomenon with respect to corruption control, is actually composed of conceptually distinct heterogeneous elements, including standardized work processes and hierarchies (the bureaucratic control type here), punishment systems, incentive alignment systems, and legal/regulatory sanctioning. Or, as decomposed differently, the circumplex demonstrates that autonomy reduction systems, consequence systems, and environmental sanctioning are all constituent elements of bureaucracy. Whichever decomposition is used, the circumplex illustrates how bureaucracy is distinct from, yet conceptually juxtaposed with, social/cultural means of corruption control. If bureaucratic control is defined narrowly (Type 1 only), the circumplex illustrates how it can be distinguished conceptually from the other administratively transmitted controls, based on its unique combination of process orientation and autonomy reduction functionality.

Foundation for Future Research

At least two characteristics of the typology in this paper provide a foundation for future study because they add conceptual depth and prompt new questions that otherwise might not have come to the attention of researchers. These characteristics are (1) the conceptualization of each type of corruption control as consisting of two dimensions, based on the orientation and transmission channel of the control, and as falling into one of four categories, based on function, and (2) the idea that any two corruption control types may be related, based on one or more of these classifications. The former characteristic leads to interesting research questions in terms of corruption control types studied in isolation, and the latter leads to questions about how the multiple dimensions relate to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of types used in combination.

Control types studied in isolation. When researchers study a specific corruption control type separately from any others, this typology can contribute conceptual depth to the research. Importantly, the typology may prompt researchers to be explicit about the dimensions underlying the focal control and to carefully examine assumptions fundamental to those dimensions. Explicit consideration of the underlying dimensions will guide model specification and choice of research methodology. Studies of control types oriented toward outcome will differ significantly from studies of controls oriented toward process—for example, in terms of dependent variables chosen. The study of control types transmitted by administrative versus social/cultural means may require different research approaches, since administrative channels tend to be codified or otherwise formalized, whereas social/cultural channels are often more difficult to observe directly.

It is also important to specify the intended function of the corruption control, whether it be to constrict autonomy, manipulate consequence systems, mediate evaluations from the organi-
zation’s environment, or nurture intrinsic motivations. Two interesting research questions, then, concern whether the focal control type is achieving the desired function and whether that function might be having counterproductive consequences. A hypothesis relevant to the first question might predict a positive relationship between the salience to employees of organizational punishment systems and the degree to which extrinsic negative consequences factor into their rational decision-making processes when they are confronted with the opportunity for personal gain through corrupt action. A hypothesis relevant to the second question might stem from the arguments that people generally are reluctant to relinquish their perceived control in organizations (Ashforth, 1989; Ashforth & Saks, 2000) and, consistent with reactance theory, that people may react counter to organizational control efforts in an attempt to preserve felt autonomy and express attitudinal freedom (Brehm, 1993). Such a hypothesis might predict that increases in autonomy reduction controls will be positively related to increases in corrupt behavior among a segment of the employee population (cf. Dukerich et al., 2005). This hypothesis might further be refined to predict that the relevant population segment will be high in a specific personality characteristic, such as need for autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Another hypothesis, also in the vein of ironic consequences and also related to reactance theory (Brehm & Brehm, 1981), might predict that high levels of organizational attempts to socially influence employee values and beliefs in order to increase intrinsically oriented corruption control will be positively related to actions by a segment of the population that are counter to the organization’s value system (cf. Dukerich et al., 2005).

Researchers might also investigate the fundamental assumptions about human nature implied in the control type under investigation. Those assumptions are deeply rooted in a long tradition of both lay and scholarly attributions of behavior (Wrightsman, 1992). The paradigmatic nature of those assumptions can lead to scholarly inertia if not scrutinized from time to time. For example, if the focal control is one that entails autonomy reduction, is it a valid assumption in the setting under study that unconstrained behavior will result in corrupt behavior?

Consideration of the underlying dimensions of a focal type of corruption control can also lead to interesting research questions in terms of organizational contingencies. Organizational contexts vary widely—for example, in terms of task predictability and the need for organizational flexibility (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986), or in terms of how similar they are to archetypical organic or mechanistic contexts (Burns & Stalker, 1966). Researchers studying a particular type of corruption control can investigate how these context differences might affect the relative effectiveness and costs of a focal type of corruption control, given its particular underlying dimensions. For example, researchers might hypothesize that a control type transmitted along social/cultural channels will be more costly to implement in a mechanistic setting than in an organic setting. Or researchers might hypothesize that a control type that aims to influence intrinsic motivation to avoid corruption will be more effective in a setting with low task predictability than one with high task predictability.

**Control types studied in combination.** The multidimensional conceptualization in this paper also provides a foundation for deeper explorations into why certain corruption control types might be more or less effective when used with certain other types. Research questions become evident from the typology regarding why and how some types may coexist without apparent conflict, and even bolster each other’s effectiveness, while other types may coexist only with apparent friction, perhaps leading to a decrease in the combined effectiveness of the conflicting types. For example, following are two observations drawn from the typology that researchers could explore.

1. When examining the circumplex, it is interesting to note that adjacent types do not seem to conflict when they do not share the same functionality, but they do possibly conflict when they share the same functionality. This means that the bureaucratic control–punishment, incentive alignment–legal/regulatory sanctioning, social sanctioning–vigilance control, and self-control–concertive control pairings may prove to be particularly compatible, or at least not conflicting, since each of the types in a given pair is transmitted along the same channel (administrative or social/culture) and also is oriented toward the same phenomenon (outcome or process).

2. The concertive control–bureaucratic control, punishment–incentive alignment, legal/regulatory sanctioning, and vigi-
lance control–self-control pairings, however, may prove to be less compatible, or even contradictory. When two control types serve the same function but achieve it in very different ways, friction between types may result. A question for scholarly exploration is why this might be. Consider, for example, that there is a fundamental difference in both the attitudes and behaviors of individuals under the influence of concertive versus bureaucratic controls. In the former, the individual is an active party in the formulation and enforcement of rules and norms. Although the individual under the influence of concertive controls is both a controller and a “controllee,” the salient role is arguably that of controller. In contrast, the sole and salient role for the individual under bureaucratic control is that of controllee, which in both attitude and behavior is a passive role.

So, while bureaucratic and concertive types rely on similar assumptions about the proclivity of certain individuals to engage in corrupt behavior, and therefore about the need to control corruption by restricting autonomy, the two control types might be in conflict when implemented. Concertive controls entail an attitude of empowerment; the resolve to shape and enforce control systems; and the behaviors of collectively debating norms, interpreting organizational values, and implementing enforcement systems. Bureaucratic control efforts could be undermined by attitudes and behaviors such as questioning, recalcitrance, and resistance that might stem from the employee empowerment entailed in concertive controls. Similarly, although the punishment and incentive alignment types share the assumption that consequences in the organization influence behavior, these types may conflict at the level of implementation. The vertical monitoring necessary to implement punishment systems may highlight the us-versus-them nature of the employment relationship and detract from the degree to which incentive alignment induces an employee to perceive his or her interests as congruent with those of the organization.

2. Another observation about the circumplex is that the two quadrants separated by the social/cultural-administrative split are arguably incompatible. Again, a question for scholarly exploration is why this might be. Consequence systems are rooted in the notion that the extrinsic consequences available in the organization influence and shape individual behavior; intrinsically oriented controls entail a nearly opposite set of assumptions, in which the impetus for behavior derives from the congruence of individual and organizational values and beliefs. Consequence systems depend on individual awareness and attention to the formalized rewards and punishments in the organization. At the level of implementation, these systems might clash with intrinsically oriented controls to the extent that an individual’s efforts to receive rewards and avoid punishments will, in fact, divert his or her attention away from understanding and adopting the value systems in the organization.

In contrast, the two quadrants separated by the process-outcome split are arguably complementary. Consider, in particular, that the bureaucratic and legal/regulatory types are apparently quite complementary. While bureaucratic controls are rooted in authority existing within the organization and legal/regulatory controls are rooted in authority existing outside the organization, both rely on an employee’s adaptation to hierarchically based strictures. Similarly, both social sanctioning—emanating from the organizational environment—and concertive control—emanating from within the organization—rely on an employee’s response to normative pressures and social sanctions and might be especially complementary.

In addition to fostering observations such as those described above, this conceptual framework, by bringing together traditionally unrelated streams of research, can contribute to future study of the effect of corruption control types used in combination. The framework draws attention to the lines of research behind each type of corruption control—research that leads to predictions about how some aspect of organizational action results in the diminution of some permutation of corruption. For example, an extensive body of literature, starting with Skinner (1938, 1966) and including research on organizational behavior modification (e.g., Luthans & Kreitner, 1985; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997), has posited and tested predictions about the relationships between extrinsic stimuli and the behavior elicited as a result of those stimuli. As described above under the punishment type of control, this research has implications for corruption control, as organizations diagnose and
manipulate the stimulus–corrupt behavior linkages.

Another example is the literature that has developed around organizational identification (e.g., Dutton et al., 1994; Pratt, 1998; Tyler, 1999). As described above under the self-control type of control, theory and empirical evidence developed in this literature can lead to predictions about the relationships between suppressions of corrupt behavior and organizational attempts to enhance employee organizational identification.

Likewise, each of the eight corruption control types contains implicit propositions about the relationship between a dependent construct (corrupt behavior) and an independent construct (control action). What remains virtually unexplored is how the variables modeled to understand one type of corruption control might have a theoretical relationship with those modeled for another type of corruption control. The multidimensional conceptualization can bring those questions to the attention of researchers. For example, what is the relationship between increased individual organizational identification and the responsiveness of employees to punishment systems? Alternatively, what is the relationship between the strength of horizontal monitoring routines described above under concertive controls and the salience to employees of external social evaluations described under social sanctioning? These and a large number of additional questions stem from the multidimensional framework as it draws attention to new connections between streams of research.

Managerial Implications

While researchers are theorizing about and testing refinements and mixes of corruption controls, wrestling with contingencies, and otherwise studying the conceptual interrelationships among control types, managers have a much more practical consideration. In every organization there is likely to be at least some use of each of the eight corruption control types. The mix of types in a given organization is probably not wholly the result of conscious design but, rather, largely an emergent phenomenon, developing over time and continuing because of organizational inertia. The consideration for managers is how to best analyze that mix of controls to ensure that it is most effectively meeting the goal of controlling corruption. With that consideration in mind, I offer at least three general implications of the analysis and discussion in this paper that might be of use to managers.

First, managers should be aware that the use of any particular corruption control type entails implicit assumptions about human nature—in other words, assumptions about why people engage in or avoid corrupt behavior. If the controls used have evolved over time and remain in the organization because of inertia, it could be that managers do not now agree with their underlying assumptions. An examination of those assumptions might show that they are not consistent with the attitude toward employees that management wishes to hold or convey, and managers might conclude that certain controls in use rely on outdated and counterproductive assumptions.

Second, it could be that managers have not considered the corruption control effect of some of the types discussed in this paper. Whereas bureaucratic and punishment controls probably are most intuitively related to corruption control, the connection between some of the other types and corruption control might not be so evident. Similarly, managers might not be aware that they are influential over such outcomes as individual organizational identification and the degree to which external evaluations are salient within the organization. An implication of this paper is that managers can consider all of the various types as potential corruption control tools. In addition, managers can make better use of those tools if they are conscious of how corruption controls can target either outcomes or process, as well as how symbolic and substantive management actions can affect both the social/cultural and administrative channels along which control is exerted.

Finally, as discussed above, there are many questions for researchers yet to resolve with respect to possible conflicts and complementarities among corruption control types. The same questions that the multidimensional conceptualization raises for researchers are also important for managers to contemplate as they take a practical approach to calculating where conflicts and complementarities might lie.

Conclusion

Before closing this paper, it is important to state some caveats. First, as is obvious, I do not review all of the relevant empirical research and theoretical work that fit into each corruption control cat-
category. In a short paper it is difficult to reflect the richness of the arguments underlying each type. My attempt to be inclusive in this model necessarily involves a trade-off between breadth and depth, resulting in a summary treatment of theories and empirical findings otherwise notable for their complexity. Second, an assumption behind this presentation of corruption control types is that organizations have the desire to eradicate corruption. This is certainly not universally the case, since corrupt activities often are condoned or even implicitly required by corporations (Coleman, 1987). Corruption that organizational leaders have no desire to control is probably best viewed as a societal rather than an organizational problem and falls outside the scope of this paper. A final important caveat is that the analysis in this paper of the dimensions underlying corruption control and of the functions of different corruption controls, and therefore of the components and configuration of the circumplex, could all be different if the ethical and ideological assumptions—and the resulting operational and ethical implications of managerial legitimacy—that I acknowledged in footnote 1 were changed.

Notwithstanding those cautionary notes, the model presented here makes a significant conceptual contribution and provides a jumping-off point for future research. The comprehensive look at corruption control in this paper facilitates consideration of control types as complex constructs in the context of other types, rather than as empirical artifacts or constructs in isolation—as has been the modal practice in the literature heretofore. The resulting typology serves as a novel way of integrating the literature and provides the theoretical means to understand both the relatedness and distinctness within the range of corruption controls. In so doing, it provides the conceptual basis for further investigation of apparent contradictions and incompatibilities, as well as complementarities, between approaches that are intended ultimately for the same broad purpose. Because of the importance of corruption to both internal and external stakeholders, and because of its perpetual prevalence, it is important to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the corruption controls that operate in organizations. It is exactly those controls that are subject to refinement, recombination, and redesign as scholars continue to reveal the nature and causes of corruption.

REFERENCES


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